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You’ll watch say ten cows come down to that [water] bowl. The boss cow gets to drink
first. Of that ten, there’ll be two that’ll say, ‘Ah, the hell with this’, and they’ll go down
into the mud. Eight will say, ‘We’ll stand back and we’ll wait — we’ll wait here’. So,
they’re just like people. It’s just fascinating for me to watch the comfort level of who they
like to be with.
These were the words of a cattle rancher from western Canada recorded during interviews that
tried to capture farmers’ and ranchers’ views about animal welfare (Spooner, Schuppli, & Fraser, 2012).
The quote indicates a little of the rancher’s understanding of cattle: that they are individuals with very
different personalities, that they have relationships with each other – sometimes hierarchical – based on
individual recognition, and that they form specific affiliations with other members of the herd.
This kind of “everyday understanding” is possessed by a great many farmers and ranchers whose
work revolves around animals. It is based on what scientists might term “narrative data” (Fraser, 2009):
descriptive observations of how specific individuals interact with other specific individuals, how they deal
with the environment in their individual ways, how they respond to different human beings, and how all
this changes (or remains consistent) in different individuals over time with maturation and learning. This
type of information gives farmers and ranchers an understanding of cattle that is similar in many respects
to the understanding that observant dog-owners have of their dogs, or that attentive zoo keepers develop
of the animals in their charge.
Some scientists develop a similar understanding of animals through research. As one example,
Goodall’s (1971) narrative accounts of the lives of chimpanzees led her to recognize emotions and
cognitions in the animals, and a similar approach has been used on other species (e.g., Moss, 1988;
Smuts, 1999). However, the everyday understanding of animals possessed by farmers and ranchers is
quite different from the scientific understanding that comes from much of the formal research on animal
behavior, partly because of the dominant research paradigm that behavioral scientists have traditionally
used: studying animals under experimental conditions rather than observing their normal lives; treating
animals as exemplars of a species, not as unique individuals; and relying on quantitative data while
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tending to dismiss narrative data as mere “anecdote” (Fraser, 2009; Mitchell, Thompson, & Miles, 1997;
Rollin, 2000). In many cases this paradigm creates little need to understand the cognitive and emotional
lives of animals, and it may cramp our ability to do so. Suppose, for example, that scientists test the
predictions of Parent-Offspring Conflict theory by quantifying the average time that parents spend near
their young as correlated with brood size and offspring age. The resulting information can be expressed in
a graph or mathematical formula, and little would appear to be gained by trying to understand whether the
parents “love” their young and the young “expect” food from the parents. Of course some scientists have
seen a role for emotion and cognition throughout the history of behavioral research. Examples include
Harry Harlow’s references to love in monkeys (Blum, 2002) and the motivational theory of Young (1959)
that revolved around positive and negative affect. But the dominant paradigms of both behaviorism
(Watson, 1924) and ethology (Tinbergen, 1963) explicitly denied the use of experiential states as playing
a role in science.
However, narrative data stimulate us to think differently. Suppose (expanding an idea of
Baenninger, 1990) that a dog in an apartment responds to the sound of one set of approaching footsteps in
the morning with growls, loud barks, stiff tail and forward ears, but to a different set of footsteps late in
the day with tail-wagging, perked ears and a mixture of yelps and whimpers. How can we possibly create
a convincing and parsimonious explanation of this complex behavior without postulating emotion and
cognition in the animal?
The postulated emotions and cognitions may, of course, be incorrect. Like any hypothesis, the
ideas need to be tested if they are to be adopted as scientific knowledge, and this can be done. For
example, if piglets become separated from their mother and litter-mates, they begin to walk more and
more rapidly, they defecate repeatedly, and they give calls that steadily increase in rate, loudness and
pitch. The everyday understanding of this behavior is that piglets experience separation distress when
they cannot find their mother. To evaluate this hypothesis, we can generate and then test predictions that
arise from it by seeing whether the different responses co-vary, seeing whether they are mitigated by the
presence of the mother or other familiar animals, and so on (Fraser, 1975).
As Marino and Allen (2017) have ably summarized, scientific knowledge of the emotions and
cognitions of cattle has become considerably richer in recent years, and has started to resemble the kind of
everyday knowledge expressed by the rancher above. But this puts science in an unusual position.
Scientists are accustomed to being knowledge providers who produce new information that is then
accepted and used by others. For example, when ranchers were confronted with White Muscle Disease in
calves, scientists showed that it was due to a selenium deficiency and could be remedied by a nutrient
supplement (Jenkins et al., 1974), and ranchers then acted on this information. But if scientists tell
farmers and ranchers that modern research demonstrates that cows can tell each other apart, that they have
individual personalities, that mother cows become distressed if their calves are taken away, and that cattle
remember which people have handled them roughly or gently, then farmers and ranchers – to whom such
things have been clear for centuries or millennia – may be moved to ponder the mental capacity of the
scientists, not of the cows. Of course, such research has merit within the value system of science because
it tests and confirms everyday knowledge so that it can be accepted as scientific knowledge, and in time
the research may result in new understanding. For example, as Marino and Allen noted, individual
housing of dairy calves – a common farm practice – results in learning deficits. But much of the research
summarized by Marino and Allen falls well short of extending the existing knowledge that already guides
the actions of farmers and ranchers.
Moreover, farmers and ranchers are not blind to the moral implications of their understanding of
cattle as emotionally and cognitively complex beings. As one rancher expressed it (Spooner, Schuppli, &
Fraser, 2012):
We’ve hired some people that had no livestock experience whatsoever.… And once they
start understanding cattle, they seem to have – you know – more respect for them,
watching behavior and understanding what some of these things that they’re doing
means.
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Recognizing cattle as complex beings creates moral conflict, and farmers and ranchers have
responded to this conflict in a wide variety of ways (e.g., Wilkie, 2005). Some become so conscientious
about animal care that they cannot sleep a full night in calving season for fear that an animal might suffer
(Spooner et al., 2012). Others make a point of not developing close attachments to animals (Bock, Van
Huik, Prutzer, Kling Eveillard, & Dockes, 2007), perhaps much as medical doctors develop a professional
distance from patients. Many learn to manage the conflict when they are still children, forming close
attachments to calves that they raise and yet learning to accept that the animals will be used for a practical
purpose at a certain point (Ellis & Irvine, 2010). Some find it painful to part with animals, especially
when an injured animal needs to be dispatched prematurely, giving a sense of both failure and emotional
loss (Koralesky, 2017).
Taken together with Marino and Allen’s review of the relevant science, what insights can we
draw from this perspective on the everyday understanding of cattle possessed by experienced farmers and
ranchers?
First, we suggest that scientists need to take qualitative, narrative data seriously. The traditional
scientific paradigm, with its reliance on quantitative data and controlled experiments, has great power to
test hypotheses but, in the case of animal cognition and emotion, has arguably stunted the generation of
hypotheses (Fraser, 2009). Incorporating narrative data into science in thoughtful ways could lead to a
more productive scientific paradigm, in part by suggesting new hypotheses that could then be tested
through the more traditional tools of science.
Second, scientists might build explicitly on the knowledge possessed by people who work closely
with the species. Experienced farmers and ranchers are species-specialists, often with decades of personal
experience interacting closely with animals. Rather than stereotype them as people who treat animals as
mere commodities, scientists might approach them more in the way that cultural anthropologists approach
the people whose cultures they study: as the obvious first line of enquiry, and as people whose knowledge
and beliefs deserve to be probed and understood.
Third, perhaps the scientific community could benefit from understanding how farmers and
ranchers approach the moral conflict that accompanies working with emotionally and cognitively
complex beings. Collectively, scientists have evolved a fairly standard, formalized approach to animal
ethics that hinges on bureaucratic procedures and committee meetings (Schuppli & Fraser, 2007). As
everyday knowledge of animals becomes more accepted into scientific knowledge, perhaps the scientific
community will develop the appreciation of animals as complex, sentient beings that many farmers and
ranchers show. In that case, perhaps we will see a wide diversity of responses to the resulting moral
conflict and ultimately a more robust questioning of the actions and decisions made in the conduct of
science.
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